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Abstract
During the post-Great Recession period, macroeconomic stability had more often 
been threatened by socioeconomic shocks due to the rising of public discontent with 
the high unemployment rate and poverty, the activation of radical parties and move-
ments, and the aggravation of the geopolitical confrontation in the world. Depending 
on the type and depth of such shocks, they become politically generated shocks and, in 
particular, affect the monetary sphere. The article investigates three types of politically 
generated shocks and their impact on the monetary sphere. It has been found out that 
the shocks generated by political populism are characterized by fiscal domination in 
the economy, the use of monetary measures in the budget deficit financing. Shocks 
arising after the use of international sanctions against certain countries have an ex-
ternal origin and primarily cause the increase in national exchange markets volatility. 
On the whole, macroeconomic and, especially, monetary instability is the result of the 
great shocks for the economy, the depth and duration of which are determined by the 
nature of the crisis, particularly, when country participates in the military conflict. The 
aforementioned types of politically generated shocks are analyzed based on the expe-
rience of countries such as Argentina, Turkey, and Ukraine, which at one time intro-
duced the regime of inflation targeting in monetary policy, but were forced to modify 
it influenced by political and economic instability.
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INTRODUCTION
The stability of the national economy and its functional ability to bal-
ance money markets largely depend on the predictability of political 
processes and when there are no sharp turns in the economic policies 
implemented by the ruling elite.
In the post-crisis period, while the economic growth was slowly recov-
ering, in many countries the level of the middle-class dissatisfaction 
with the current economic situation began to emerge. In addition, rad-
ical parties and movements started to gain popularity, whose coming 
to power could lead to taking the populist measures in order to obtain 
short-term stimulating effects that may have negative consequences 
for macroeconomic stability in the long term. The monetary branch 
of executive power is especially vulnerable to political risks, which, in 
the context of populist sentiment activation, is often forced to apply 
measures of the budget deficit monetization, manual control of the 
exchange rate and conduct the credit expansion. Herewith the central 
banks’ independence declared by most countries legislation is limited 
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within a small segment of operational independence, which in general is not able to ensure the imple-
mentation of strategic objectives of monetary policy.
However, recently the generation of the macroeconomic stability risks does not only carried out by eco-
nomic populism as a long-standing phenomenon. It was also accompanied by a sanctions policy that is 
applied by economically influential countries to their partners in international trade and financial re-
lations in order to encourage them to meet certain economic and political requirements. Over the past 
few years Iran, Russia, and Turkey have been added to traditional sanction recipients like North Korea, 
but in certain institutional sectors.
The complex nature of politically generated shocks arises in the cause of hostilities that take place in a 
particular country’s territory. Here, the budget deficit and the growth of public debt are caused by the 
active economy militarization, the subordination of monetary and fiscal policies to the task of the pri-
mary military-industrial complex development and the provision of military and economic advantages 
over the actual or probable opponent.
Different political shocks have a multiplier effect on the monetary sphere, the central banks function ful-
fillment and the deformation of the current monetary policy regimes. Typical countries that have not long 
ago experienced the impact of the aforementioned shocks on the money market and the banking system 
are Argentina, Turkey and Ukraine, with their nature of political instability and monetary reaction. 
1. LITERATURE REVIEW
There are a lot of studies in economic literature 
devoted to the investigation of the impact of vari-
ous political risks on the functioning of the money 
market and the banking system, where price sta-
bility and reflected monetary policy are sacrificed 
to the interests of the political situation.
Alqahtani et al. (2019) profoundly analyzed the 
impact of US political instability and monetary 
policy uncertainty on stock markets performance. 
Corbet et al. (2017) studied the influence of cen-
tral bank monetary policy announcements on 
macroeconomic stability in different countries as 
well as the effects of international monetary policy 
changes on bitcoin returns. 
Yevdokimov et al. (2018) analyzed the role and 
influence of political shocks and economic free-
dom on macroeconomic and monetary stability. 
For this purpose, the authors used the integrat-
ed index of economic freedom, calculated by the 
Heritage Foundation and Democracy Index.
Dornbusch and Edwards (1990) deeply investigat-
ed the social and economic origins of political pop-
ulism in Latin America. Frequent interchanges of 
left-wing forces with their proposals for the large 
businesses expropriation and right-wing radical 
politicians with rigid anti-democratic approaches 
formed an extremely unstable political and mac-
roeconomic environment. According to the au-
thors, the main features of the populist economic 
policy are the creation of favorable preconditions 
for the development of populism in the form of 
uneven income distribution and the invisible ad-
vantages of the previous macroeconomic stabili-
zation, often done at the request of the IMF, that 
ignore any types of macroeconomic policy restric-
tions during its implementation. Political capaci-
ty is considered as freedom ensuring in order to 
implement expansionary measures. Previously ac-
cumulated international reserves and a strength-
ened exchange rate create additional motivation 
for stimulating policies.
Under the supervision of unprejudiced monetary 
policy of the pre-crisis period, there was an impor-
tant subordination of the monetary institutions 
that acted at that time as well as the independ-
ence of central banks, which served as a guaran-
tor of political risks counteraction. Then scientific 
publications tended to the necessity of ensuring a 
gradual monetary policy aimed at providing price 
stability even contrary to the desire of current eco-
nomic power. However, authorities are obliged to 
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put monetary policy into service for temporary in-
terests under the pressure of a pro-populist elec-
torate. According to Feliz (2019), for today in Latin 
America, the left-wing ideas show a great vitality 
warming up by the economic successes of social-
ist China in the world, the influence of political 
ideas of H. Chávez, and the negative attitude to-
wards the IMF restrictive measures for many years. 
In this context, left-wing political forces assumed 
Mauricio Macri’s coming to power in Argentina 
in 2015 as a counter-revolutionary attack on the 
workers’ rights through the introduction of un-
popular measures of fiscal and monetary recovery 
of the economy. Therefore, even if the government 
implements a deliberate budget deficit reduction 
program (as it was in Argentina in 2016–2017), 
the fiscal dominance retains when the central 
bank finances a budget deficit of up to 2% of GDP 
(Manuelli & Vizcaino, 2017). Contrary to this view, 
Cavallaro and Maggi (2016) think that in case of 
avoiding an economic collapse in Argentina, an 
expansionary monetary policy with reduced inter-
est rates should be a compensator for macroeco-
nomic imbalances and mitigate fiscal pressure.
The uncertainty in relation to the populism in 
the monetary sphere is often worsened by the 
International Monetary Fund. The IMF may show 
inconsistent policy on making decisions about sta-
bilizing crediting in countries such as Argentina, 
due to contradictions between leading mem-
ber-states and the expert community that do an 
adequate assessment of the economic situation 
and the ways for its support (Van Gunten, 2017).
The first wave of populism was typical for Latin 
America. After the great recession, the second 
wave raised and had injured the central banks 
of other countries. According to Masciandaro 
and Passarelli (2018), political populism brings 
short-term benefits to the electorate in the form 
of a temporary increase in welfare, but in the long 
run, it reduces the potential output and the level 
of consumption. The central banks’ activities with 
their conservative monetary policy are increas-
ingly becoming the subject of criticism for pop-
ulist-minded nationalists. Therefore, states need 
to be prepared for such central banks reforms, in 
which they may lose partly their independence, 
and monetary policy could become chronically 
inflationary. 
Countries are given of trade and economic sanc-
tions by international organizations or individ-
ual countries have a slightly different origin of 
politically generated macroeconomic shocks. 
Thus, in Turkey, not only the USA administra-
tion sanctions negatively affected country’s real 
and financial sector in 2018 but also the deforma-
tion in government policy and the cyclical econ-
omy “overheating” (Matthes, 2018). The sanction 
measures have played a decisive role in threaten-
ing currency stability, while macroeconomic and 
monetary shocks having external origin from the 
financial markets of the USA, the Eurozone and 
the global raw material and energy markets have 
a long-term effect on the domestic market (Civcir 
& Varoglu, 2019). According to Binici et al. (2019), 
quantitative easing in the monetary policy of the 
post-crisis period subserved not only a signifi-
cant increase in the money supply in Turkey but 
also led to a certain loss of the central bank’ of-
ficial interest rate that played regulatory role in 
the money market. Moreover, the short-term in-
terbank market rate has become the indicator of 
the credits and deposits value flow.
The most difficult situation in the economic 
sphere in general and monetary in particular 
has occurred in recent years in Ukraine, where 
the aggravation of geopolitical conflicts with the 
Russian Federation resulted in the annexation 
of some part of the territory and the outbreak 
of hostilities in the east of the country. Under 
these circumstances, on the one hand, the de-
velopment of military-industrial potential with 
parallel pressure on the expenditure part of the 
state budget took place, on the other hand, the 
Crimean regions and part of the Donbas lost 
the production potential, which meant a loss of 
significant sources of budgetary revenues. As a 
result, the country faced a threat of default on 
external liabilities. Under such circumstances, 
according to specialists, in order to achieve fi-
nancial stability of the Ukrainian economy, it is 
necessary on the contrary to reduce the budget 
deficit to prevent a default (Shevchuk & Kopych, 
2018), but there is a lack of the authorities’ po-
litical will to achieve this goal. The relative eco-
nomic stability was ensured by the given IMF 
extended credit. However, some authors argue 
and suggest the idea that in case of maintain-
ing optimal growth of the Ukrainian economy, 
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it would be rational to provide a moderate mon-
etary expansion with a balanced fiscal policy 
(Lukianenko & Dadashova, 2016).
Meanwhile, the raw material-oriented economy 
of Ukraine has a structure that is intense to glob-
al price shocks and tends to significant currency 
fluctuations, which just needs the implementa-
tion of a flexible monetary regime that is inflation 
targeting. Its specificity implies “anchoring” of 
inflationary expectations and the reaction to the 
expected inflation rate, which eventually imple-
ments a significant counter-cyclical component 
in macroeconomic policies and ensures the cen-
tral bank’s independence from the government’s 
policy pressures (Koziuk, 2018). Moreover, price 
stability and its maintenance on the inflation tar-
geting basis largely correspond to a democratic 
political regime that enables financial develop-
ment, which positively affects the availability of 
flexible exchange rates with anti-shock goals.
2. AIMS
The purpose of the article is to identify the chan-
nels and the driving forces of political risks. Also, 
the effect of generated macroeconomic shocks by 
political risks on the national monetary sphere 
functioning by comparing the disclosures and 
results of political instability in the economies of 
countries such as Argentina, Turkey and Ukraine 
was investigated.
3. METHODS
The politically generated macroeconomic shocks 
influence on the monetary sphere was studied by 
using the methodology of systemic comparative 
analysis in the following directions:
1) a comparative politics: a comparative 
cross-country analysis by comparing the 
origins of political upheavals in Argentina, 
Turkey, and Ukraine as countries with differ-
ent types of political risks; 
2) a theoretical comparative analysis: a compara-
tive analysis of monetary policy strategies and 
the types of inflation targeting deformation, 
depending on the concrete situation in one or 
another country;
3) a dynamic comparative analysis: a statistical 
comparison of macroeconomic dynamics in 
the period before the onset of macroeconomic 
shock and after it;
4) a practical comparatism: comparing the ef-
fectiveness of measures taken by the central 
banks of the compared countries to the politi-
cal and economic instability and determining 
the adequacy of their reaction. 
4. RESULTS
Macroeconomic shocks generated by political 
events have different origins, the depth of their ac-
tion and, accordingly, the scale of their influence on 
the economy, in general, and the monetary sphere, 
in particular. The first of the three main shocks is 
a populism, connected with the coming to power 
of political forces giving unrealistic promises about 
improving the voters’ welfare through fiscal and 
monetary easing, even threatening macroeconomic 
stability. The second type is sanctions that are sug-
gested by the deterioration of foreign trade and for-
eign investment conditions due to imposing special 
restrictions by international partners. Initially, it is 
a signal for the growth of foreign economic threats 
and sharp currency market fluctuations. The third 
type of political shocks after the Second World 
War is rather unusual, especially for Europe, and 
involves forcible revision of present state borders 
through the outbreak of hostilities and a visible or 
invisible annexation of part of the territory. As a re-
sult, there is an inter-regional and inter-market eco-
nomic imbalance, the monetary sphere suffers from 
monetary disordering, the banking system failures 
and abnormalities appear in financial markets.
At the same time, these shocks have a number of 
common features inherent to unstable economies, 
where the money market and the banking system 
react sharply to the least political turbulence, rein-
forcing it with “herd” reaction. These features are 
the following:
• initially, sharp fluctuations of the national 
foreign exchange rate with its, mainly, further 
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devaluation. Its depth depends on specific 
monetary conditions and the level of the de-
valuation expectations;
• generation of inflationary expectations and 
subsequent increase in actual inflation;
• slowing down of growth rates or even falling 
of real GDP, first of all, in import-dependent 
economies with an inelastic decline in import;
• reduction of central bank official reserves, the 
rate of which depends on the depth of the for-
eign exchange market imbalance, the national 
monetary authorities activity in ensuring ex-
change rate stability and financial support of 
the international monetary institutions;
• increase of the debt burden on the economy 
both in the part of the public and private ex-
ternal debt due to its rise in the national cur-
rency owing to the national currency devalu-
ation. The debt devaluation increase is often 
supplemented by its quantitative growth in 
consequence of additional borrowings on the 
domestic and foreign financial markets.
In general, the influence chain of politically gen-
erated shocks on the monetary sphere and the real 
sector can be represented as follows (Figure 1).
The peculiarity of the transmission of the dis-
turbing impulses is that the first and last links 
in the shocking course of events concern the po-
litical sphere, where the economic development 
risks occur at first, and eventually, after injur-
ing the financial and real sectors, the crisis sit-
uation of the political community itself breaks 
down.  
Let us consider the specifics of the monetary policy 
establishment in the context of intensification of each 
of these political shocks by illustrating examples 
of events happened in countries close to the mone-
tary policy structure. The authors chose Argentina, 
Turkey, and Ukraine. Despite the fact that each of 
them has its own type of politically generated risks, 
the common features in the structure of the real sec-
tor, the monetary sphere and the political environ-
ment allow for a comparative analysis of the political 
shocks impact on macroeconomic stability in these 
countries. The common features are as follows: 
1) The industrial and agrarian kind of the real 
sector with a significant share of agricultur-
al production in GDP (5-10%) and exports, 
which makes the economic situation great-
ly dependent on environmental and weather 
conditions, and the subsequent drought and 
crop failures generate a shock of the commod-
ity market supply.
2) The mainly negative balance of payments over 
a long time and the high dependence of for-
eign economic equilibrium on world market 
conditions, the reliability of foreign financ-
ing sources and the continuity of their func-
tioning in order to stabilize the balance of 
payments. As a result, significant foreign ex-
change market volatility appears.
3) The political instability, roughly equal chanc-
es of political forces with different socio-eco-
nomic development vectors in the parliamen-
tary and presidential elections victory, the 
prevalence of liberal-conservative or social 
priorities pronounced by them, which often 
force them to use populist promises in the po-
litical struggle.
Figure 1. Transmission mechanism links of the politically  





Growth in demand 
for liquid assets
Increase in the asset value (interest rate, exchange 
rate, prices of goods and services)
Mistrust in political power
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4) A similar structure of the monetary sphere 
with a commonly accepted paradigm of the 
central bank role in the economic system 
and the modern monetary policy mechanism 
aimed at inflation control through traditional 
and newest monetary instruments.
5) Use of the monetary regime of inflation tar-
geting (IT), introduced at different times but 
aimed at achieving the disinflation effect in 
the medium term.
However, the similarity of the structure of the 
monetary sphere does not mean its full identity in 
all three countries, because there is certain spec-
ificity in the IT implementation by each of them 
(Table 1) that influences the formation of political-
ly generated shocks as well.
Thus, all this makes a legitimate comparative anal-
ysis of the politically generated risks mechanisms 
and the country specificities of their overcoming 
by monetary measures.
4.1. Populist shocks and their 
monetary neutralization  
(the example of Argentina)
Traditionally, the populist political programs are 
widely used in Latin American countries, where 
the right-wing reactionary regimes being in power 
are often replaced by radical left-wing.
Political and economic instability due to period-
ic populism revelation has forced international 
monetary and financial institutions to develop a 
special stabilization plan called the Washington 
Consensus for such countries. This type of macro-
economic policy, introduced at the end of the 20th 
century, was recommended by IMF and World 
Bank leadership for implementation in countries 
with financial and economic instability that could 
get macro-stabilization credits.
Argentina is the third-largest economy in Latin 
America, whose gross national income per capita 
in 2017 indicated its affiliation with high-income 
countries (although after the shock, the figure was 
somewhat lower) (Table 2).
However, macroeconomic instability was obvi-
ous in Argentina and begun much earlier than 
the Great Recession. Starting from the 1990s, the 
economy stagnated from time to time due to polit-
ical contradictions, when populist democratic re-
gimes were replaced by military dictatorships, and 
attempts to liberalize the economy ended with 
populist revenge. After losing support from the 
IMF, Argentina was forced to declare a default in 
2001. The political cause for the macro-shock was 
Table 1. National features of the structure of monetary policy in Argentina, Turkey, and Ukraine 
Source: Based on data from the official websites of the central banks of Argentina, Turkey, and Ukraine.
Country
Argentina Turkey Ukraine
National regulator Banco Central de la Republica Argentina
Central Bank of the Republic 
of Turkey National Bank of Ukraine
The current monetary policy regime Monetary targeting Inflation targeting Inflation targeting
Year of implementation 2018Q4 2006 2016
Target indicator Monetary base Consumer price index Consumer price index
Unit of measurement Monthly growth  of monetary base Annual CPI Annual CPI (±) deviation
The characteristic of the monetary regime Hard Soft Soft
The main monetary transmission channel Monetary Interest rate Interest rate
The declared current regime duration Three quarters Three years Three years
Period of inflation targeting actions 2016Q2–2018Q3 2006–present 2016–present
Preparatory period to the IT implementation 2015–2016Q1 2002–2005 2014–2015
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the change of presidential power when, during 
one week, four presidents were changed. Currency 
and financial turbulence significantly affected the 
real sector, negatively influenced the population 
welfare, and inevitably radicalized the political 
situation in the country.
Later, a strict populist policy was carried out by 
President Cristina Kirchner. During her 2007–
2015 cadence, she was accusing the establishment 
of the country’s economic problems, the USA 
big business, and the activities of pro-Western 
institutions. As part of economic reform, there 
were nationalized large enterprises, and export-
import operations were assessed by high taxes. 
Subsidization of gas, electricity and fuel tariffs has 
changed Argentina from an exporter to an im-
porter of energy resources. Inflation has risen dra-
matically too. Longstanding significant govern-
ment budget deficits, reaching 6% in 2015–2016 
(Table 2) with the absence of external financing 
sources, resulted in a big increase in gross public 
debt, which grew from 37.5 to 55.1% of GDP in 
2011–2015. Contrary to the common economic 
laws there was an attempt to repay the state debt 
by central bank’s gold and currency reserves, but 
it was ended with the impeachment and subse-
quent change of the presidential power.
Mauricio Macri was elected as the new president 
of Argentina, who promised to implement swift 
and painful reforms in order to liberalize the 
economy, attract investors, reduce inflation rate 
and fight against poverty.
The new government quickly softened the restric-
tions on capital movements, got back the country 
to international financial markets and removed 
some restrictions on foreign trade. However, the 
attempt to drastically cut state subsidies for gas 
and electricity was unsuccessful due to the ju-
diciary opposition. As a result, macroeconom-
ic growth had ascending dynamics, but did not 
become irreversible (Figure 2). Due to the politi-
cal opposition and, consequently, an inappropri-
ate implementation of the restrictive measures 
there was a cut of production instead of economic 
growth from 2017 to the beginning of 2018. The 
reason for this was the deterioration of the mac-
roeconomic conditions through the peso deval-
uation, the complicated international financing 
of the national economy and crop failure in crop 
production. 
A major factor in the maintaining instability was 
the increased inflation, which showed a tendency to 
decrease from December 2016 to August 2017, and 
since September 2017 began to leap rapidly, reach-
ing 48.5% per year in December 2018 (Figure 3).
The inflation targeting regime with a target rate 
of 17%, initiated in 2016, was quite achievable in 
the long run, but the CPI growth since September 
2017, due to peso exchange rate fluctuations and 
an increase in regulated prices and tariffs, caused 
the inflationary expectations of business entities 
with a cumulative rise in prices within the next 
months. This forced the CBA to change the mon-
etary policy regime from October 2018 to the side 
of harder measures of monetary targeting.
During the macroeconomic instability, the most 
volatile object is the exchange rate of the nation-
al currency. The Argentine peso demonstrated 
Table 2. Indicators of Argentina’s macroeconomic development in the post-crisis period
Source: World bank, IMF.
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
GDP annual growth (%) 6.0 –1.0 2.4 –2.5 2.7 –1.8 2.9 –2.5
GNI, Atlas method (current USD) 10,610 11,790 12,770 12,260 12,300 11,940 13,040 …
Foreign direct investment, net outflows (% of GDP) 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.3 0.2 …
Inflation, end of period consumer prices (%) 9.5 10.8 10.9 23.9 …** …** 24.8 47.6
Current account balance (% of GDP) –1.0 –0.4 –2.1 –1.6 –2.7 –2.7 –4.9 –5.4
General government structural balance (% of potential GDP) –3.8 –3.6 –4.2 –4.1 –6.5 –6.9 –6.8 –3.7
General government gross debt (% of GDP) 38.9 40.4 43.5 44.7 52.6 53.1 57.1 86.3
Broad money growth (annual %) 26.0 34.8 27.1 29.8 39.6 41.5 30.1 …
Interest rate spread (lending rate minus deposit rate, %) 3.4 2.0 4.8 4.3 3.7 7.0 9.7 …
Note: ** Data is not available due to the change in the CPI calculation methodology.
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significant fluctuations in 2018 (Figure 4). At first, 
the central bank caused it by itself, having raised 
the inflation target from 10% to 15% on the eve 
of 2018. Therefore, the CBA generated inflation 
and exchange rate expectations that emerged im-
mediately on the currency market in an attempt 
to consistently adhere to the short-term inflation 
targeting regime. In addition, the idea of inflation 
targeting was mistaken, because the goal given 
away by the central bank was unchanged during 
the medium-term period.
A series of inconsistent steps made by the CBA and 
the government gave the market a wrong signal for 
a change in the stabilization policy course and in-
creased inflationary expectations. An additional 
challenge for the economy was the crop failure of 
the export crops that had worsened the country’s 
balance of payments. Eventually, on September 
4, 2018, the Argentine authority in the economic 
sphere was obligated to meet with the IMF lead-
ership and to take the crucial decision about the 
beginning of technical negotiations to provide 
Argentina with macro-financial assistance be-
cause of the market destabilization.
On account of the crisis, the CBA was forced to 
temporarily defeat the inflation targeting regime 
and implement from October 2018 a new mone-
tary policy framework with a hard peg to the size 
of the monetary base, which means a reappear-
ance to the monetary targeting regime, although 
it was introduced for 9 months. According to the 
new scheme, the CBA is due not to raise the mone-
tary base until June 2019, which will be difficult to 
do, since in recent months the monetary base was 
growing by more than 2% per month. As a result, 
it is expected that the money supply will be signif-
icantly reduced owing to the decrease in the value 
of the money multiplier, as well as the money sup-
ply and the monetary base in the current calcula-
tion. The CBA has chosen the monetary base as the 
nominal anchor since its components (the bank-
ing system reserves and money in circulation) are 
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fully under central bank control. Monetary target 
is reached by conducting daily operations on li-
quidity accounts in the interbank market. Besides, 
this goal can be achieved by adjusting the mini-
mum reserve requirements for liquidity. 
Also, the termination of inflation targeting takes 
place in the foreign exchange market regulation. 
While the exchange rate of peso is floating, the 
CBA has the right to carry out currency interven-
tions if the price of the dollar goes beyond 34-44 
pesos. The currency band is adjusted monthly by 
3%, and if there are exchange rate fluctuations be-
yond the band, the regulator conducts daily cur-
rency interventions in the amount of USD 150 
million, which helps to absorb excess liquidity and 
achieve a zero growth of the monetary base. 
The CBA communication policy and transparency 
of decision-making procedures play a key role in 
improving the situation on the money market.
Thus, macroeconomic imbalances are the result of 
the long-term policy of social and economic pop-
ulism that could not be overcome immediately 
and require government’ decisive action to carry 
out consolidated financial statements and mone-
tary restrictions. In this case, the transition from 
the medium strategy of inflation targeting to the 
monetary base targeting since the end of 2018 to 
mid-2019 seems to be logical. Then it is advisable 
to restore the IT regime with the gradual return 
to annual CPI in the limit of previous currency 
band value. However, it is important not to allow 
a sharp disinflation, as it may reduce the real GDP, 
due to the braking restrictive policy. Therefore, 
the CBA should postpone the achievement of the 
stated inflation target for 2-3 years and return to 
the strategy of inflation targeting.
4.2. The threat of authoritarianism 
and sanction political shocks  
(the example of Turkey) 
Unlike Argentina, in Turkey in recent years the 
political elite has demonstrated signs of large-scale 
power expansion, a disturbance in the balance of 
“checks and balances” in favor of the presidential 
branch of government. The political confronta-
tion between the Justice and Development Party 
(AKP) headed by current President Recep Tayyip 
Erdogan, on the one hand, and the opposition on 
the other, leads to revealing the authoritarian ten-
dencies from the establishment, the collapse of the 
liberal democracy system, and sometimes coup 
d’état (the attempt of such a coup took place on 
July 15, 2016, and went into a phase of strict re-
pression with further ruthless cleansing of mili-
tary personnel and state apparatus). Political in-
stability formed a negative macroeconomic shock, 
which resulted in a decrease of real GDP growth in 
half in 2016, although Turkey still showed steady 
growth, and inflation was limited to unequivocal 
numbers in the post-crisis period (Table 3).
Instead of the instability caused by the repressions 
among opposition activists and the government 
violent reaction that stood after the unsuccessful 
Source: CBA.
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coup, there was a negative economic shock added 
by the USA government sanctions and the threat 
of their spread to the domestic Turkish and for-
eign financial markets. 
On August 3, 2018, sanctions were imposed 
against Abdullah Gül, the Ministry of Justice of 
Turkey, and Süleyman Soylu, the Minister of the 
Interior. They were banned from entering the 
United States, and their assets were frozen. It was 
the Washington reaction to the house arrest of 
American pastor Andrew Brunson, whose impris-
onment was organized by officials. The situation 
worsened on August 10, when the US President 
Donald Trump doubled the import duty on steel 
and aluminum imported from Turkey.
After that, the major stock exchanges of the Asia-
Pacific region, in the face of fears related to the fi-
nancial crisis in Turkey, closed trades with a de-
cline in quoted price within 2%. European mar-
kets reacted to the possibility of Turkish turbu-
lence in the same way. Initially, the financial crisis 
in Turkey threatened emerging markets. Next, the 
economic risks associated with the fall of the ex-
change rate of Turkish lira led to an appreciation of 
the yen, the dollar, and the Swiss franc, which are 
alternatives and more secure assets for investors.
Instead, the Central Bank of the Republic of 
Turkey (CBRT) proclaimed that it was ready to 
take all necessary measures for financial stabili-
zation. Under those circumstances, the regulator 
has promised to provide banks with all the neces-
sary liquidity of about USD 10 billion. At the same 
time, it was planned to increase the limits of bank 
guarantees in foreign currency for operations with 
Turkish lira from 7.2 billion to 20 billion euro.
In addition to weekly overnight loans, private 
banks received foreign exchange credits for one 
month. If there was a necessity, tenders were an-
nounced for long-term repo rates and curren-
cy placements with a maturity of 91 days. Also, 
banks were given the room for maneuver to man-
age guarantees on operations in Turkish lira, de-
pending on the types and timing of interest rates.
However, currency disturbances immediately re-
flected in the inflation dynamics. In August 2018, 
consumer prices grew by 17.9% compared to the 
same month of the previous year. This increase 
was the largest since the end of 2003 when infla-
tion reached 15.85% (Figure 5).
CBRT has sharply raised the key interest rate due 
to the results of exchange rate fluctuations and the 
rise of inflation. The bank management decided 
to change the rate from 17.75 to 24 percent. CBRT 
also announced a decision to intensify monetary 
policy in order to limit the inflation threat for 
price stability. Market entities predicted an in-
crease of approximately 3 percentage points. In 
their opinion, the growth which was higher than 
expected would prevent the fall of the lira. After 
the taken measures, the exchange rate of Lira be-
gan to recover.
However, in September 2018, inflation was even 
higher than in the previous month. The inflation 
rate in September was 25% compared to the same 
period in 2017 (Figure 5) and 6.3% compared to 
August of the current year. It was the highest fig-
ure for the last 15 years.
Despite the fact that personal sanctions were 
abolished in October, the market stabilization is 
going slowly, as there were not only the political 
Table 3. Turkey’s macroeconomic development indicators in the post-crisis period 
Source: World bank, IMF.
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
GDP annual growth (%) 11.1 4.8 8.5 5.2 6.1 3.2 7.4 2.6
GNI per capita, Atlas method (current USD) 11,230 11,880 12,530 12,590 12,000 11,230 10,940 ...
Foreign direct investment, net outflows (% of GDP) 0.3 0.5 0.4 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.3 ...
Inflation, end of period consumer prices (%) 10.4 6.2 7.4 8.2 8.8 8.5 11.9 20.3
Current account balance (% of GDP) –8.9 –5.5 –6.7 –4.7 –3.7 –3.8 –5.6 –3.6
General government structural balance (% of potential GDP) –2.7 –2.5 –3.0 –2.1 –3.5 –3.3 –5.0 ...
General government gross debt (% of GDP) 36.5 32.7 31.4 28.8 27.6 28.3 28.3 ...
Broad money growth (annual %) 15.2 10.4 21.2 11.2 16.5 17.6 16.4 ...
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negative effects but also the inexplicable building 
boom, which was credited by the banks of Spain, 
Italy and other European countries. An outstand-
ing example of the unreasonable gigantomania 
of the Turkish government is the new Istanbul 
Airport, the full capacity of which remains to be 
quite doubtful. 
Altogether, the monetary sphere of Turkey was a 
hostage of political instability. On the one hand, 
there was the internal confrontation between 
political forces, military actions in neighboring 
Syria, and the dissatisfaction of the middle class 
with the betray of democratic principles, and, on 
the other hand, external factors such as the esca-
lated contradictions between the Turkish authori-
ties and the establishment of the European Union, 
the United States and NATO. Political instability 
has overwhelmed the financial markets and raised 
inflationary expectations, which resulted in main-
taining annual inflation rate at 5% that was far be-
yond of target at the end of the decade. It seems 
that reaching the inflation target under further 
political stability will also have to be postponed 
for 2-3 years.
4.3. Political shocks in terms  
of the hybrid war (the example 
of Ukraine)
In contradiction to the two abovementioned 
countries, Ukraine is in the most difficult situa-
tion, for not only the change in the political situ-
ation but also the military conflict in the east that 
has a significant impact on the economy. Among 
the post-Soviet republics, it experienced the deep-
est decline in the 1990s under the transformation 
process. At the same time, the economic recovery 
since 2000 was also hard. During the great reces-
sion, the economy lost 14.8% of its GDP, while 
during the military-political aggravation in 2014–
2015 it was 16.4% (Table 4).
The military-political shock had a significant im-
pact on annual inflation, which rose to 48.7% in 
2015, and the exchange rate of the dollar against 
the national currency, hryvnia, had climbed more 
than two times.
In the process of getting over the macroeconom-
ic shock generated by geopolitical factors, the 
National Bank of Ukraine set up the inflation tar-
geting regime as a new monetary policy strategy. 
The IT in Ukraine was officially installed in 2016, 
after the critical phase of the macroeconomic 
shock that threatened the economic system by 
the military conflict in the East, the imbalanced 
banking cleansing, poorly managed devaluation 
of the hryvnia and the recession of the real sec-
tor. By that time, the methodological, technical 
and organizational preconditions for such a tran-
sition were formed and consisted of creating the 
analytical and forecast system of the National 
Bank, launching a quarterly publication of in-
flation reports, introducing a system of business 
and bank surveys on inflation expectations, and 
developing a model for testing financial stabili-
ty in the country. In addition, the NBU initially 
supported the transition to the floating exchange 
rate regime and provided the growth of the dis-
Source: CBRT.
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count rate as the main instrument of monetary 
policy. It should be mentioned that the creation 
of the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) and 
strengthening communication with the public 
about the future actions of the National Bank of 
Ukraine leadership was another prerequisite for 
the IT implementation.
When the IT was launching, the macroeconom-
ic environment had been stabilized somewhat, 
however, a clear disinflationary trend and a mo-
notonous downward price dynamics occurred 
only in 2018–2019 (Figure 6). The inflation with 
a rate of 43.3% in 2015 changed and was 12.4% 
and 13.7% in 2016 and 2017, respectively. And 
only in 2018, the inflation rate fell below 10%, re-
maining still above the long-term target with an 
upper limit of 6.5%. However, besides return in-
flation to the targeted band of 5 ± 1.5%, the fol-
lowing are needed: the further reduction of infla-
tion expectations, stabilization of the foreign ex-
change market through cooperation with inter-
national monetary institutions, targeted reform 
of market institutions to improve the investment 
environment.
The remission of inflation at the end of 2018 
forced the NBU to lengthen the term of achiev-
ing a medium-term inflation target. In addition, 
a floating inflation targeting regime supported 
the NBU and the planned inflation rates at the 
level of 5 ± 1 percentage point of annual inflation 
will not be reached in 2019 (as it was provided 
by The Main Principles of the Monetary Policy 
for 2018), and, obviously, in 2020 (according to a 
new assessment of the inflation situation by the 
National Bank).
It is not worth disapproving the National Bank 
of Ukraine for allowing the excessive elastici-
Table 4. Macroeconomic development indicators of Ukraine in the post-crisis period 
Source: World bank, IMF.
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
GDP annual growth (%) 5.5 0.2 –0.03 –6.6 –9.8 2.4 2.5 3.3
GNI per capita, Atlas method (current US$) 3,120 3,500 3,800 3,560 2,650 2,310 2,390 ...
Foreign direct investment, net outflows (% of GDP) 0.1 0.6 0.2 0.4 0.04 0.2 0.2 ...
Inflation, end of period consumer prices (%) 4.6 –0.2 0.5 24.9 43.3 12.4 13.7 9.7
Current account balance (% of GDP) –6.3 –8.1 –9.2 –3.9 1.7 –1.5 –2.2 ...
General government structural balance (% of potential GDP) –3.2 –4.5 –4.8 –3.0 –0.4 –2.0 –2.0 ...
General government gross debt (% of GDP) 36.9 37.5 40.5 70.3 79.5 81.2 71.9 ...
Broad money growth (annual %) 14.7 12.8 17.6 5.3 3.9 10.9 9.6 ...
Interest rate spread (lending rate minus deposit rate, %) 8.1 5.4 5.9 5.6 8.8 7.8 7.3 ...
Source: NBU.
Figure 6. Annual consumer and basic inflation rates  
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ty of IT, because there are too many factors of 
unexpected changes in the macroeconomic sit-
uation. In addition, the National Bank does not 
fully control inflation processes, as they are 
strongly influenced by non-monetary factors 
that include significant openness of the econo-
my and dependence on global risks of domestic 
development, monopolization of some markets 
with the monopolists ability to upward prices, 
dollarization of the money market, state regula-
tion of prices and tariffs, which recently served 
as a significant point of the growth of the general 
level of prices in the country. In view of this, it is 
extremely necessary to coordinate the National 
Bank’s activities with other executive branches.
However, the current NBU policy and the prac-
tical plane of the IT regime implementation are 
still in question. Firstly, whether a discount in-
terest rate is a fairly effective monetary policy 
instrument and whether the interest rate chan-
nel of the monetary transmission works reliably 
since the repeated increase of the discount rate 
during 2018 did not appreciably affect inflation 
rates. Secondly, whether inflation is out of con-
trol regarding the hryvnia exchange rate fluctu-
ations, which, after the proclamation of the float-
ing regime, has a powerful influence on prices 
through the mechanism of imported inflation. 
And, finally, which should be the limits of the 
flexibility of inflation targeting, so that eco-
nomic entities trust in it will not be completely 
lost due to the excessive inflation targets vola-
tility, as it has happened in Argentina. Besides, 
monetary challenges may become a macroeco-
nomic shock in case of the new political forces 
that came to power after the 2019 presidential 
election get away the principles of stabilization 
policy and suggest weaknesses or errors in its 
implementation. 
CONCLUSION
Thus, politically generated shocks undermine the country’s macroeconomic stability, disturb financial 
markets and, eventually, prevent the growth of the real sector. Their influence on the monetary sphere 
relates to a number of political and economic processes and can be summarized in the context of com-
parative analysis as follows. 
The most powerful political impact is observed in the long-term military and political events, which 
disturb inter-sectoral and interregional proportions and greatly destabilize market processes. Populist 
and sanction political risks have a smaller multiplier effect on the economy. The difference between 
the politically generated macroeconomic shocks is that the populist policy causes, first of all, the 
shock of aggregate demand, activated by heightened expectations of economic entities regarding fu-
ture incomes and prices. The market reaction to previous events is characterized by the homogeneity 
in all three cases: an increase in prices for goods and services, financial and real assets, and for labor. 
Foreign exchange markets are the most volatile in the monetary sphere, especially in the case of po-
litically generated sanction shocks, closely related to a foreign economic imbalance. 
In all three types of political instability, the regulatory effect of central banks is the increasing flexibility 
of the inflation targeting regime.
The leveling of the root causes of the political instability generation is based on the international and 
national coordination of the opposing sides, mainly in the long run. The political risks of populist origin 
in Argentina can be neutralized by mobilizing sufficient political will of the authorities and the pub-
lic willingness to improve prosperity in the long term; cancelling international sanctions for political 
stabilization by the negotiation process and fulfilling the requirements of the partner countries, which 
was mainly done in Turkey; solving the military-political confrontation from the point of Ukraine force 
seems unlikely due to the threat of open external interference, and negotiations on reconciliation are 
still impossible owing to the parties antagonism, which threatens in the future the emergence of the 
conflict into a permanent political instability with the prospect of freezing the conflict for many years.
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